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ADDENDUM TO THE REGULATIONS PROBLEM
OR the past year, eminent tax lawyers have been batting back
and forth the problem of the binding effect of regulations is-
sued by the Treasury to interpret or supplement tax legislation.'
Most of the fun has come in mauling the so-called" reenactment"
rule, which is said to be in danger of coming to mean that when
Congress has reenacted a revenue act, the regulations under the
former act acquire the" force of law" as if Congress had specifi-
cally written them into the statute.2 So extensive has been the
recent writing in this field that the latest and best, Professor Gris-
wold's Summary of the Regulations Problem,3 commences with an
apology for further comment. Under the circumstances, still an-
other word on the subject would seem superfluous. Nevertheless,
I do have an excuse to offer. The other writers on the subject have
been tax lawyers, who have written about the problem as primarily
one in tax administration; 4 there is still need to ask whether the
reenactment rule should be abolished in other fields of adminis-
tration.
One may ask the preliminary question -why did the courts
evolve the reenactment rule? I suggest that the answer lies in the
inevitable desire to find fixed points in the confusion which sur-
rounds the liberal interpretation traditions of the federal courts.
Once the " plain meaning " rule in the stringent formulation of the
English cases ' is abandoned, the courts find themselves in a welter
of "aids to construction ": committee hearings, committee re-
1 Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem (1941) 54 HARv. L. REv. 398;
Brown, Regulations, Reenactment, and the Revenue Acts (1941) 54 HARv. L. R1v.
377; Alvord, Treasury Regulations and the Wilshire Oil Case (1940) 40 COL. L. REv.
252; Surrey, The Scope and Effect of Treasury Regulations under the Income, Es-
tate, and Gift Taxes (I94o) 88 U. or PA. L. REv. 556; Paul, Use and Abuse of Tax
Regulations in Statutory Construction (940) 49 YALE L. J. 66o.
2 Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U. S. 110, -z5 (1939). For
earlier formulations of the rule see Griswold, supra note i, at 399.
3 Supra note x.
4 Lee, Legislative and Interpretive Regulations (1940) 29 Gao. L. J. i, deals
largely with matters outside the tax field, but its scope is broader than the narrow
problem of reenactment here considered.
5 E.g., Altrincham Electric Supply, Ltd. v. Sale Urban District Council, 154
L. T. R. (N.s.) 379 (H. L. 1936).
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ports, administrative and judicial constructions, legislative pur-
pose, evils to be anticipated, results, analogous enactments, re-
enactments. Lacking fixed points, the courts are in danger of
falling into an irrational Gefiiklsjurisprudenz unless they devise
standards to evaluate these aids to construction. The development
of such standards is hampered by the struggle between two fre-
quently antithetical principles: legislative intent looking back to
the date of enactment, and administrative soundness and stability,
looking to practical operation after enactment. The attractive-
ness of the reenactment rule to the courts seems to be its apparent
reconciliation of these principles; by reenacting the statute Con-
gress appears both to have expressed its own intent and added an-
other stone to the pillar of continued administrative practice.
While the critics of the reenactment rule have shown that this
attractiveness is in large measure delusive, they appear to have
underestimated the difficulties of dislodging the doctrine. Gris-
wold has pointed out that the reenactment rule is not a recent
excrescence. The point could be reenforced by considering a
parallel line of cases which, I believe, have been given insufficient
attention. In a number of situations the Supreme Court has given
weight to the mere failure of Congress to disapprove an adminis-
trative construction. In United States v. Midwest Oil Co.,6 the au-
thority of the President to withdraw petroleum and other mineral
lands from public settlement was challenged. Congress had in
19o2 received a report from the Secretary of the Interior listing the
various withdrawals and asserting that the President possessed the
power to order them. In 191o, the President specifically asked for
congressional authorization and Congress enacted a statute au-
thorizing future withdrawals but not expressly validating past ac-
tion. The majority of the Court held the silence of Congress to be
enough to validate the previous withdrawals, saying:
Congress with notice of this practice and of this claim of authority,
received the Report. Neither at that session nor afterwards did it ever
repudiate the action taken or the power claimed. Its silence was ac-
quiescence. Its acquiescence was equivalent to consent to continue the
practice until the power was revoked by some subsequent action by Con-
gress.7
7Id. at 481.
"J 'ADTFA'DT 7" AT I'7 "DL' TTT T 7 I'T T^I _
6 236 U. S. 459 (1915).
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Much the same rule was invoked only the other day in Sibback
v. Wilson & Co.8 The issue was whether Rule 3 5 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, providing for physical examination of
parties, was valid in view of earlier Supreme Court decisions dis-
approving the practice of examination. In upholding the validity
of the Rule, the Court relied in part on the fact that when the Fed-
eral Rules were before Congress, it failed to disapprove this pro-
vision. The Court was cautious enough not to say that the silence
of Congress gave the Rules the force of law; it did say, however:
" That no adverse action was taken by Congress indicates, at least,
that no transgression of legislative policy was found." ' An analo-
gous situation is found in United States v. American Trucking As-
sociations,'° involving affirmance by the enactment of another stat-
ute. The question was the delimitation of authority between the
ICC and the Wages and Hours Administration over hours of serv-
ice of employees of motor vehicle operators. The Court empha-
sized that the Fair Labor Standards Act " was enacted after the
ICC had construed the pertinent provision in the Motor Carriers
Act, 2 and that "seemingly the Senate at least was aware" of the
Commission's construction. The Court thereupon concluded that:
"C Under the circumstances it is unlikely indeed that Congress
would not have explicitly overruled the Commission's interpreta-
tion had it intended to exempt others than employees who affected
safety from the Labor Standards Act." "8 These were cases in
which it affirmatively appeared that Congress had been apprised of
the administrative construction. In United States v. Shreveport
Grain & Elevator Co.,"4 however, mere congressional acquiescence
by silence in a long-continued administrative construction was
held to be of greater significance than a contrary intent at the time
of enactment apparent in congressional committee reports.
8 61 Sup. Ct. 422 (Jan. 13, 1941).
9 Id. at 427. Mr. justice Frankfurter (dissenting with Justices Black, Douglas,
and Murphy) disagreed strongly: "Plainly the Rules are not acts of Congress and
cannot be treated as such. Having due regard to the mechanics of legislation and the
practical conditions surrounding the business of Congress when the Rules were sub-
mitted, to draw any inference of tacit approval from non-action by Congress is to
appeal to unreality." Id. at 428.
10 310 U. S. 534 (1940).
11 52 STAT. io6o (1938), 29 U. S. C. § 201 (Supp. 1939).
12 49 STAT. 543, 546 (1935), 49 U. S. C. § 304 (Supp. 1939).
IB 3io U. S. at 549-50. 14 287 U. S. 77 (1932).
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Obviously this rule of acquiescence by silence is worse than the
reenactment rule. It should by all means be abolished, and it is
unfortunate that the Court should have relied on it so recently.
That the courts have gone this far indicates the difficulty of eradi-
cating the superficially more defensible reenactment rule. As the
critics have shown, the notion that mere reenactment of a tax stat-
ute involves a congressional affirmation of administrative prac-
tice is unrealistic in fact and mischievous in result. Yet there is
still some question outside the tax field as to whether reenactment
should be considered an aid in determining the weight to be given
administrative constructions.
The factor which differentiates tax administration is the periodic
reenactment of the basic statute. This practice is not necessarily
a mere accidental tradition, though we may have seen the end of
it; the provisions of the taxing act must be varied to meet the fiscal
and business needs of the moment. True, there are basic provi-
sions which remain unaltered from year to year; but where there
is such frequent and serious revision of detail, it seems a sensible
thing to reenact basic provisions also. Regulatory statutes are dif-
ferent. Congress is not legislating for the next fiscal year; it is lay-
ing down a general policy intended to last for a long time to come.
Reenactment of such a statute is very rare, and when it occurs the
occasion is fraught with significance.
Consider the major statutes which have gone through the proc-
ess of reenactment. The Federal Radio Act was substantially re-
enacted in 1934 15 because a new agency with greatly extended
powers was created. The same reason lies behind the reenactment
in 1935 16 of many of the provisions of the Federal Water Power
Act of 1920. Parts of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933,
as amended, were reenacted in 1937.' The occasion was a major
change in the system of regulation following the declaration of un-
constitutionality of the old Act. The Grain Futures Act was sub-
stantially reenacted by the Commodity Exchange Act in 1936,"8
when it was desired to extend the scope of the Act to additional
agricultural commodities. Numerous provisions of the Bank-
1 48 STAT. io64, 47 U. S. C. § 151 (1934).
16 49 STAT. 838 (935), 16 U. S. C. § 791a (Supp. 1939).
17 50 STAT. 246 (1937), 7 U. S. C. § 6oi (Supp. 1939).
1s 49 STAT. 1491 (1936), 7 U. S. C. § I (Supp. 1939).
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ruptcy Act were reenacted in the Chandler Act, 9 which was an
epochmaking revision of the whole system of bankruptcy and re-
organization. The Judicial Code 20 reenacted many provisions of
existing law on the occasion of a significant change in the federal
judicial system. Even if this list were exhaustive it would not be
very long, for outside of the tax field, Congress has shown marked
reluctance to reenact provisions of existing law on a large scale.
The history of the Transportation Act of 1940 is instructive. An
attempt was there made to codify and reenact the Interstate Com-
merce Act 2 as a whole through the Wheeler Bill (S. 2009). The
attempt was vigorously condemned by several witnesses before the
Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce; in particular by Com-
missioner Eastman.22 The result was the substitution of the Lea
Bill, which amended and added various provisions to the Interstate
Commerce Act but attempted no reenactment. And it was this
latter bill which was finally adopted.2
Thus, in the case of the ordinary regulatory statute, reenact-
ment comes very seldom if at all. When there is a reenactment, it
is not for convenience in use by lawyers as in the case of internal
revenue statutes, but because a significant change either in policy
or in the general form of the Act is desired. Where reenactment is
so infrequent and important an occasion, should not administrative
constructions which have gone through the fire of reenactment be
considered of more moment than those which have not stood in
similar peril of congressional disapproval?
The objection to an affirmative answer is that it is unrealistic,
that Congress is not aware of the details of administrative prac-
tice under the old statute. Valid as this objection is as a general
19 52 STAT. 840 (1938), 11 U. S. C. §I (Supp. 1939)-
20 36 STAT. io87 (I9uI), 28 U. S. C. § 1 (1934).
21 24 STAT. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 STAT. 543 (1935), 49 U. S. C. § I (Supp.
1939).
22 TransportatioD Act of 1939, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Inter-
state Commerce on S. 2009, 76th Cong., ist Sess. (1939) 782. Note the statement of
Senator Reed: "I do not think it is good public policy to undertake codification of
an act that is the growth of legislation over 5o years, at a time when we are amend-
ing and revising and deleting the present provisions of the law and adding new
duties and responsibilities to the greatest of the regulating bodies, the Interstate
Commerce Commission." Id. at 784.
23 Pub. L. No. 785, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (Sept. 18, 1940), 49 U. S. C. A. § i
(Supp. 194).
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proposition, I am not convinced that it is sufficient. Standards of
construction must have something of the conventional in them.
When courts look for" legislative intent "they know full well that,
strictly speaking, there is no such thing. There is neither an ascer-
tainable intent of the individual legislators nor, in any realistic
sense, a corporate intent. What is ascertainable and what the
courts look to is the intent of the committees and their chairmen. 4
Upon this realistic basis the courts build the convention of the in-
tent of the whole legislature. I suggest that similar conventions
with a basis in reality are possible in connection with reenactment.
The strongest case is in the field of congressional appropriations.
Frequently the object of appropriation is described in very general
terms: "public works," " projects," "work relief," and the like.
Where an agency construes its powers as covering a particular
class of expenditure and Congress thereafter appropriates money
under the same general description, it has been held that the new
appropriation constitutes congressional ratification of the validity
of the original expenditure.25 This seems an altogether proper re-
sult under the circumstances. It is the universal practice to report
such expenditures to Congress, and appropriations committees ex-
amine expenditures with great care.2" The record may not show
24 Compare the now classic debate on statutory interpretation between Radin
and Landis in (1930) 43 HARv. L. REv. 863, 886.
25 Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 64 Wash. L. Rep. 563 (D. C. Sup. Ct. June 5,
1936), aff'd on other grounds, 91 F.(2d) 303 (App. D. C. 1937), aff'd, 302 U. S.
464 (1938). The authority of the PWA to construct electric power projects com-
petitive with private utilities was challenged. The original appropriation for public
works was contained in Title II of the National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 STAT.
210 (i933), 40 U. S. C. § 411 (i934). Several subsequent acts appropriated money
for the continuance of PWA projects in general terms. These acts were held to con-
stitute congressional approval of the PWA program.
26 The same result should follow in the cognate problem of the creation by the
President of governmental agencies under the very general delegations of authority
contained in recent statutes. In the case of a number of these agencies Congress has
never enacted a specific authorization, but in several cases it has either reenacted
the basic statute, appropriated money for the agency by name, or referred to it by
name in some other statute. Some notion of the great variation in congressional
practice may be gathered from a few examples. The Commodity Credit Corpora-
tion was incorporated under the laws of Delaware pursuant to an executive order
issued under the NIRA; its continuance was specifically authorized by Section 7
of the Act of Jan. 31, i935,49 STAT. 1, IS U. S. C. § 713 (Supp. 1939). The National
Youth Administration was established by executive order under authority of the
Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935. It was not specifically authorized by
I3P6 [Vol. 54
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that the committee specifically approved the particular item, and
if we were to be hyper-realistic we should refuse any effect to the
reenactment. Yet sound realism would require that we give effect
to the established tradition of committee scrutiny even in the ab-
sence of specific reference in the record. The point I make here is
not as yet of any great importance to the lawyer, since problems of
the validity of appropriations rarely come to court. But it may
soon become very important. Congress now has before it various
proposals for administrative reform which include provisions for
annual reporting of administrative regulations to Congress." The
courts may consider this reporting as of considerable importance
in the event of reenactment, and indeed, may go so far as to apply
the "acquiescence by silence" rule. Such a result would be un-
fortunate. Yet, if Congress were to set up a committee to scruti-
nize these reports on regulations, reenactment in the background
of such a tradition of scrutiny should have great weight.
The next strongest case is the matter of major administrative
policy following a" historic" reenactment (i.e., once-in-a-lifetime
as distinguished from the routine reenactment of the tax laws).
If the policy is one which Congress must have known about, re-
enactment of the law without change is rather clear evidence that
Congress had found the practice in accord with the statute.8
Note that again we are dealing with a convention but it is a con-
vention with a realistic basis - that Congress knows matters of
common knowledge.
The next case is considerably weaker - where the practice al-
leged to have been ratified by reenactment is a matter of adminis-
trative detail rather than major policy and where there is no de-
monstrable tradition of congressional scrutiny. Is it proper to
Congress, but in the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1936 and in subsequent
appropriation acts, appropriations were made to the agency by name. The Re-
settlement Administration was also established by executive order under the Emer-
gency Relief Appropriation Act of '935, but no appropriation was made to it by
name in the 1936 Act. However, the Act of June 29, 1936,49 STAT. 2035, 40 U. S. C.
§ 431 (Supp. 1939), provided for a waiver of the exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States over any resettlement project constructed "with funds allotted or
transferred to the Resettlement Administration."
27 See § 205 of the bill proposed by the Attorney General's Committee on Ad-
ministrative Procedure. FmnuA REPORT (1941) 195.
28 1 take it that Professor Griswold would agree with this point. See footnote
16 of his article, supra note i, at 401-402.
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say that the fact of reenactment is always inconsequential? I
am inclined to the view that under some circumstances the fact of
reenactment may, even here, be properly considered. Thus, where
statutory provisions are reenacted without change as part of a
major revision of organization and policy after prolonged and
detailed study by a congressional committee and its experts, it
seems not altogether unrealistic to say that administrative prac-
tice under the reenacted provisions stands on a somewhat surer
footing than before. I do not mean to place any very great weight
on reenactment under these circumstances. It should serve only
as additional assurance when the meaning of the statute has been
shaped from other aids. In the words of Mr. Justice Frankfurter:
" The persuasion that lies behind that [the reenactment] doctrine
is merely one factor in the total effort to give fair meaning to lan-
guage." 29
What I suggest is an application of the reenactment rule with
varying degrees of light and shade depending on the circumstances
of reenactment. In no event do I urge the extreme " force of law"
formulation of the rule as stated in the Reynolds Tobacco case.3
Bad as it may be in the income tax field, it would be even worse
if applied to other statutes. Income tax statutes are designedly
temporary. The congressional machinery is geared to the cor-
rection of undesirable constructions by rapid amendment. If the
Commissioner were to find that the Reynolds Tobacco rule pre-
vents him from changing an interpretation after reenactment, it
is in most cases relatively easy for him to appeal to Congress to
amend the law. At any event, he can anticipate the framing of a
new revenue act shortly which will give him an occasion for at-
tempting to secure a change. The traditions are different in the
case of regulatory statutes. Thus, successive Attorneys-General
tried for years to secure an amendment of the commodities clause
of the Hepburn Act " and never succeeded. 2 Numerous similar
instances could be cited. The reason is usually not that Congress
thinks the amendments undesirable, but that for political reasons
29 FCC v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 311 U. S. 132, 137 (1940).
30 Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U. S. iio (1939).
a' 34 STAT. 585 (igo6), 49 U. S. C. § 1(8) U934).
2 i. A(,96 G7Ni. (1909) 3; id. (1912) 4; id. (9 ; id. (91974) 5, 22; i('r9ig) 7; id. (1916) 7; id. (1917) 7; id. (1927) 26.
1318 EVol. 54
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it is often reluctant to subject statutes of controversial social pol-
icy to the amendment process. It is necessary, if flexibility and
adaptability to changing conditions are to be preserved, to avoid
any rule freezing administrative interpretations and preventing
change by any except congressional action.
A word of caution is necessary on Professor Griswold's vigorous
espousal of the great weight to be given to the contemporaneous
construction of a statute. It is of course true that "contempo-
raneous regulations often express the general understanding of the
times, and the actual understanding of men who played an impor-
tant part in the drafting of the statute." " It is certainly true in
the case of tax laws where the participation of Treasury draftsmen
is highly important. It may, indeed, be true generally where a
statute confers new powers on an existing agency, but it does not
apply where the agency was not in existence when the statute was
passed. We know, for example, that the personnel of the Social
Security Board participated in the drafting of the 1939 amend-
ments to the Social Security Act." But that personnel did not par-
ticipate in the drafting of the original act. This is perhaps a minor
consideration. More important is the fact that as time passes,
specific legislative intent may become less and less significant. 5
This is particularly true where an act expresses a major policy of
government in general terms. The legislative history of the Sher-
man Act 36 is not nearly as important as the facts of present-day
business organization to which the general policy in favor of a free
competitive market must be applied. Precisely what Congress
33 Griswold, supra note i, at 405.
34 49 STAT. 620 (ig3s), as amended 53 STAT. 136o (1939), 42 U. S. C. § 301
(Supp. X939). See testimony of Arthur 3. Altmeyer, Hearings before Senate Com-
mittee on Finance on H. R. 6635, 76th Cong., ist Sess. (1939) 1 et seq.
35 Compare the striking language of Chief Justice Hughes on the relevance of the
intent of the framers of the Constitution in Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,
290 U. S. 398, 442-43 (1934).
36 26 STAT. 209 (18go), 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1934).
87 The opinion in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 33o U. S. 469 (1940), illustrates
this point. The Court pays considerable attention to the legislative history of the
Sherman Act, but does not place exclusive reliance on it. The legislative history is
coupled with the course of events since enactment. Thus the court speaks of "The
legislative history of the Sherman Act as well as the decisions of this Court inter-
preting it," and again of "The legislative history and the voluminous literature
which was generated in the course of the enactment and during fifty years of itiga-
tion." Id. at 490. Most striking is the manner in which the Court rejects the con-
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thought it was doing when it enacted the rule against unjust and
unreasonable discriminations in the Interstate Commerce Act is of
only mild practical interest after the judicial and administrative
glosses of decades have been laid over the original text. So too,
contemporaneous constructions of such acts should not be singled
out for too great consideration. 8 Should the contemporaneous
construction of the Webb-Pomerene Act " by the Federal Trade
Commission be given greater weight than a contrary construction
twenty years later when the Commission has secured real experi-
ence with the operations of export associations? Reliance on the
contemporaneous must not become a means for freezing an impor-
tant statutory policy into the forms determined by the necessarily
limited vision of its original administrators.
A second word of caution is needed on the question of legislative
versus interpretative regulations. There can be no doubt of the
validity of the distinction in principle. The legislative regulation
is an exercise of a permissive authority to make a law to supple-
ment or make effective the law passed by Congress. It is a re-
sponse to the authorization: " the administrator may make such
rules and regulations as are necessary to carry out the provisions
of this section," or to the direction to the citizen to do such and
such "under such rules and regulations as the administrator shall
prescribe." The interpretative regulation, on the other hand, is
not new law, but rather construction of a disputed term in a stat-
ute. In practice, this distinction becomes blurred and may be diffi-
cult to administer.4" What looks like an interpretative regulation
tention that Congress intended wholly to exclude labor organizations and their
activities from the Sherman Act. Without pausing to consider the contemporaneous
legislative history, the Court gives the "short answer" that "for the thirty-two
years which have elapsed since the decision of Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, this
Court . . . has repeatedly held that the words of the act . . . do embrace to some
extent and in some circumstances labor unions and their activities; and that during
that period Congress, although often asked to do so, has passed no act purporting to
exclude labor unions wholly from the operation of the Act." Id. at 487-88.
58 In United States v. Chicago Heights Trucking Co., 310 U. S. 344, 353, n.i6
(i94o), Mr. Justice Black properly distinguished an early decision construing the
Interstate Commerce Act as "an apparent exception, at an early date before the
function of the Commission had become fully outlined against the background of
time and the empiric pattern of litigation."
39 40 STAT. 516 (1918), IS U. S. C. § 61 (1934).
40 Compare the controversy over whether the regulations involved in Helvering
v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U. S. 90 (1939) were legislative or interpretative. See
Alvord, supra note i, at 257; Surrey, supra note i, at 572.
[Vol. 541320
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may on close inspection be seen to be legislative, and vice versa.
An exercise of a power to make legislative regulations may involve
construction of a disputed term in the statute. Several writers have
suggested that the distinction has important consequences. Thus
Professor Griswold says:
It would seem clear, though, that reenactment must be immaterial as to
the validity of a legislative regulation. Either the regulation is within
the authority delegated by Congress, or it is not. If it is within the dele-
gated power, there is no question of a proper construction of the statute
or of actual legislative intent, and reenactment is not necessary. If it is
beyond the delegated power, then, under even the strongest formulation
of the reenactment rule, no amount of reenactment can help it."
I confess that the validity of the conclusion of this statement is
not apparent to me. Assuming that the reenactment rule is to be
applied where the question is one of the meaning of an ambiguous
term in the statute, why should it not be equally applicable where
the question is whether the administrator has overstepped the
bounds of a broad delegated power? Is it correct to say that there
is no question of " actual legislative intent "? While there is no
question of the intent of Congress on the substance of the statute,
there is a question of intent as to how far the administrator was to
be allowed to go under his general authority. Obviously, if it can
be shown that Congress knew of the existence of an allegedly il-
legal legislative regulation when it reenacted the basis statute, the
reenactment will be given weight. The analogy of express con-
gressional ratification of an unlawful exercise of delegated power 2
is close. If the force of reenactment in the case of legislative regu-
lations is granted in this instance, it seems to me that any sub-
stantial reason for differentiating between legislative and inter-
pretative disappears.
The aversion of tax experts to the reenactment rule is due as
much to observation of its abuses in the tax field as to criticism of
its logical basis. There can be no doubt that uncritical applica-
tion of a standard of interpretation can be a serious evil. Yet,
should an aid to construction be abolished because it can be put to
4" Griswold, supra note z, at 4o. Accord, Alvord, supra note 1, at 262; cf.
Surrey, supra note i at 565.
42 Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States, 300 U. S. 297 (1937).
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improper uses? 11 The remedy is a more realistic consideration of
the weight to be given to reenactment in the specific case. Where
reenactment is a perfunctory routine as in the tax field it should
be disregarded. Where a tradition is established of reporting
administrative practice to Congress with detailed scrutiny by com-
mittees, as in appropriations acts, reenactment should be of con-
siderable moment. Important weight should be given reenactment
where a matter of major policy is involved. Where reenactment is
a rare occurrence, it may mean much, or little, or nothing, depend-
ing upon the circumstances of both the regulation and the reenact-
ment.
Rules of this kind would sound much better if they were
expressed in precise formulae, but lack of precision is not an in-
superable obstacle to administration. The reenactment rule, con-
sidered as an aid to construction rather than as a command, can
help a court to arrive at sensible and stable constructions if court
and counsel are willing to examine with care the circumstances
surrounding reenactment and regulation.
A. H. Feller.
YALE LAW SCHOOL.
43 Compare Landis in connection with the rule of legislative intent: "The fact
that in the name of such a rule fictitious intents of legislatures have been derived by
courts to conceal the fact that they, rather than the legislature, were in this instance
the lawgivers, does not impeach the validity of the rule, but merely demonstrates
an inapposite case for its application." A Note on "Statutory Interpretation"
(1930) 43 HARv. L. Rxv. 886.
IVol. 54"1322
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POSTSCRIPTUM
Mr. Feller has kindly allowed me to add a few words to his
study of the regulations problem. I shall confine myself to re-
enactment. My chief difficulty with the reenactment rule as it has
been used is that it seems almost never to be the reason for reach-
ing a result. It is rather an explanation for reaching a result
which was in fact reached on other grounds. If the result reached
is consistent with the reenactment rule, then the reenactment rule
is brought out. But if the result is not consistent with the rule,
then reenactment is either ignored or explained away. A doctrine
which is largely or often used only to make impressive a result
reached on other grounds still seems to me unsound.
There really is not much difference between Mr. Feller's posi-
tion and mine. An explanation may serve a purpose. What I am
talking about is mere reenactment. If there is more than mere
reenactment, that may well have weight. If it appears that the
congressional committees actually considered the precise regula-
tions, that will be entitled to a good deal of weight. If the statute
in question was completely reconsidered and revamped by the
committee after long hearings and thorough consideration of all
aspects of problems relating to the administrative agency in ques-
tion, that may have some weight. If the particular problem is one
of fundamental policy, which has been mooted back and forth for
years, that should have some weight. Anything that can be shown
which has some tendency to prove that the congressional action
(or inaction) really has some significance is relevant, and should
be used for what it may be worth. But the mere fact of reenact-
ment (which is usually all that is relied on in the tax cases, and
in a good many others) should be recognized, it seems to me, as a
will-o'-the-wisp.
The point may be summarized in this way: Reenactment plus
something amounts to whatever the "plus" is worth; but re-
enactment alone should be without weight. In actual practice,
particularly in the tax field, the cases which have arisen have with
few exceptions been ones in which there was mere reenactment
.... "1
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without any other significant circumstance. Where there is re-
enactment plus, the reenactment may well be considered along
with the "plus." But where the bald fact of reenactment stands
alone, which is perhaps the typical case, at least in the tax field,
my argument is that it should lend no weight, one way or the
other, in determining the validity and application of a regulation.
Erwin N. Griswold.
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